collective on foreign affairs
24th September 2023
1] INTRODUCTION
As Syrian President Bashar al-Assad arrived in Beijing, September 21st, 2023, (Southern Metropolis Daily, September 23, 2023) being the leader’s first visit to China since shaking hands with Xi’s predecessor in 2004 at the time when his country civil war -instigated by western proxy war regime change plan – has claimed more than half a million lives, the prominent issue is how to replace confrontations with dialogues and alliances with partnerships in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) geopolitical region, (Global Times, 22/09/2023, chinese-media link).
While recognizing China has limited influence in the Middle East, and does not necessarily need to mediate, but more appropriate to say that she tries to “coordinates” 协调 between major powers and warring factions, while “promoting peace talks and pushing for negotiations” 劝和促谈, thereby creating a template with due favorable environment for any peaceful resolution between nation states.
Referencing to Syria, one may intimate that China plays a constructive role by supporting the centrality of the UN and relevant resolutions as she has had appointed special envoys to the region since 2002, including one for Syria in 2016; besides, China had more than once, proposed five- and four-point plans in 2014 and 2021, respectively, for a political settlement of the conflict.
Indeed, China and Syria announced the establishment of a strategic partnership. The joint declaration contains statements of mutual support regarding all the issues that are dear to both countries. These range from Damascus’ backing of Chinese policies in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, to Beijing’s promise to provide “all it can” to help with Syrian reconstruction, (as reported by Global Times, July 20, 2021).
Announcement of the establishment of the strategic partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Syrian Arab Republic (full text)], PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 22, 2023, is in this link (中华人民共和国和阿拉伯叙利亚共和国关于建立战略伙伴关系的联合声明（全文).
2] SYRIA and the UNITED NATIONS
While Dr. Adedeji Ebo, Deputy to the High Representative of the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs, in July 2023 had expressed that Syria has refused to cooperate in weapon disarmament, and that “due to identified gaps, inconsistencies, and discrepancies that remain unresolved, the declaration submitted by Syria cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention“, and at the same time, The Council reported a “near-unanimous in calling on Syria to cease undermining and obstructing the work of the Technical Secretariat, and to allow unhindered access to all sites investigated by the OPCW technical team“, nonetheless, it needs to be pointed that Chinese representative Sun Zhiqiang had said that Beijing holds a “different interpretation” of the geopolitical situation.
Sun urged the international community to “view Syria’s efforts objectively” and to respond to Syria’s concerns and demands in a more “professional and transparent manner,” alluding to flaws in the work of the UN body for the Chemical Weapons Convention (the OPCW).
Beijing also believed that Assad has been unnecessarily stressed out by the council’s inquiries and that the UN’s limited resources have been squandered. In Sun’s opinion, “the Council should reduce the frequency of its deliberations on the matter,” adding that “this would enhance the Council’s efficiency and reduce [the] use of its resource.”
3] SYRIA, CHINA and the WORLD
Syria’s re-admission to the Arab League in May 2023 was welcomed by Arab States, (Guagming Daily, May 10, 2023), even though some regional actors, primarily Qatar, objected to mending ties with the regime, whilst others, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), are shifting towards pragmatism. Oman and Iraq, never cut ties with the Assad regime. Indeed, the UAE began its campaign for normalization back in 2018, when opening its embassy in Damascus, (Foreign Policy, June 2023).
Then, there are still countries in the region that have yet to welcome Assad. Qatar and Egypt, in particular, have their own specific and dynamic reasons for ambivalence toward Syria.
Further, as Cafiero noted in a recent piece for the Stimson Center, Qatar certainly seems keen to preserve its relationship with the United States and the broader West, even though increasingly clear that the Syrian conflict is an unauthorized war, and that there is no tenable legal ground for continuing the U.S. operation in Syria, (Foreign Affairs, 11th. January, 2022).
China-based analysts have credited the changing process to the “wave of reconciliation” launched by Chinese mediation in March when Beijing brokered a détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
In February, when the world marked the first anniversary of the Ukraine war, China had dropped a 12-point position paper on a solution to the “Ukraine crisis”; (read also Strategic Neutrality on Ukraine).
As with its boilerplate four- and five-point proposals for Syria, the solution China actually offered was needed as much as it was effective in alleviating the pain of the victims of aggression and their families.
And as with the 12-point plan, Xi’s Global Security Initiative (GSI) will be high on the agenda of Assad’s visit. The GSI’s objective is to build a global security architecture to rival the US-led system of treaties, alliances, and institutions.
It will feature alongside the BRI, the Global Development Initiative (GDI), see the diplomat, 11/07/2023; and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI).
Beijing paints the initiatives as the four pillars undergirding Xi’s vision of a Community of Shared Destiny for Mankind and realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.
Together, they serve as the blueprint for China’s recently released Proposal on the Reform and Development of Global Governance.
China had also adeptly highlighted legitimate grievances held by Global South nations toward the US and the West, stemming from decades of unsanctioned military interventions, inveterate meddling in internal affairs of other countries, and the hypocritical “democracies vs. autocracies” narrative, among other things.
“The US and the West don’t really care about democracy in the Middle East and are instead attempting to turn their Middle Eastern allies into tools for confronting non-Western powers”,
Fudan University Professor Sun Degang had expressed.
He further reiterated that China is leading a group of economically driven Asian nations that are assisting in the creation of a “new Middle East” free from the narrow American and Western geopolitical interests, (see csloh,2023, A New Middle East).
4] CHINA IN MEDIATION
China’s Middle East policy has grown to be a key component of her peripheral strategy [国周边战略, sometimes translated as rim/neighborhood strategy.
In the 21st century, with the MENA region being a major source of energy, China was enabling to coordinate Middle East problems to smother hotspot issues toward a more peaceful path ahead.
Indeed, on mediating Middle Eastern hotspot issues, “China has been seen as a proponent of new principles of international relations, such as “dialogue instead of confrontation, partnerships instead of alliances” 对话而不对抗、结伴而不结盟.
As reiterated by Tian Wenlin, a researcher at the Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations:
“In contrast [to the United States], China has consistently advocated from a sense of justice, promoting peace talks, playing a constructive role as much as possible. What is most impressive is that China has vetoed many proposals made by the United States and other Western countries at the United Nations since the beginning of the crisis that sought to interfere in Syria’s internal affairs. […] The return of order in Syria and the improvement of its foreign relations are indirect evidence that China’s policy of opposing foreign interference is correct and that China is a truly responsible major country.”
Furthermore, China has not only continued to coordinate on the Palestinian issue but has also emerged as a key player in the Iranian nuclear talks. Following the 18th CPC National Congress – in November 2012, when Xi was appointed General Secretary – China continued to break new ground in its major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics.
From an outsider perspective, China is perceived to have played a more extensive role in the comprehensive coordination of hotspots such as the continuous Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Iranian nuclear file, the Syrian, Libyan, and Yemeni civil wars, and other hotspot issues. It can also be said that it has played an important, and and indispensable 不可或缺, yet proactive role, too.
We shall follow what Professor Wang Bo and Dr. Mu Chunhuan in investigating China’s motivation for becoming more involved in mediating or “coordinating” conflicts in the Middle East in the New Xi Jinping Era.
The approach from China’s transactional thinking in “coordinating” conflicts in the Middle East, it is in consistent of advancing China’s Middle East strategy, whereby the mindful coordination of diplomacy not only amplifies China’s influence within the region but also shapes and focuses China’s global image as a responsible major power.
[The article was published in the biannual journal of the School of History at Beijing Normal University by China Social Sciences Press, titled Studies on the History of Sino-Foreign Relations 中外关系史研究 (Vol.1)].
Since heralding its reform and opening up in the late 1970s, China has gradually moved into a more pragmatic phase of its diplomacy. As a permanent member of the Security Council, China embarked on a full-fledged process of major power coordination 大国协调 of Middle Eastern hotspots, beginning with its good offices on the Palestinian issue and shuttle diplomacy in dealing with the Gulf crisis.
“Although China was initially unable to exert significant influence on Middle Eastern affairs due to its [limited] power 实力, its involvement created a favorable environment for peace talks.
“China has not only continued to coordinate on the Palestinian issue but has also emerged as a key player in the Iranian nuclear talks. Following the 18th CPC National Congress [in November 2012, when Xi was appointed General Secretary], China has continued to break new ground in its major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics.
“Middle East policy has grown to be a key component of China’s peripheral strategy [国周边战略, sometimes translated as rim/neighborhood strategy]. In the 21st century, the MENA region has also become a major source of energy, and China’s ability to coordinate hotspot issues in the Middle East has also grown in a parallel process.
“In mediating Middle Eastern hotspot issues, China has been a proponent of new principles of international relations, such as “dialogue instead of confrontation, partnerships instead of alliances” 对话而不对抗、结伴而不结盟.
“It has played a more extensive role in the comprehensive coordination of hotspots such as the Israeli-Palestinian [conflict], the Iranian nuclear file, the Syrian, Libyan, and Yemeni [civil wars], and other hotspot issues. It can be said that it has played an important, indispensable 不可或缺, and proactive role”, (read China’s role in the world today).
According to Fudan University’s Sun Degang: “With the resumption of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, relations between Syria and countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Turkey have improved, and Syria’s room for diplomatic maneuvering has been greatly improved. This will also help enhance China-Syria relations and deepen bilateral cooperation.”
5] Conclusion
On January 20, 2014, Foreign Minister Wang Yi presented the Five Proposals on the Political Settlement of the Syrian Issue:
• The issue of Syria must be resolved through political means;
• The future of Syria must be decided by its own people;
• An inclusive political transition process must be promoted;
• National reconciliation and unity must be achieved in Syria;
• Humanitarian assistance must be delivered in Syria and its neighboring countries.
This diplomatic initiative was followed up with Wang Yi meeting with Syrian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Walid Muallem, as well as Ahmad Asi al-Jarba, President of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces [aka Syrian National Revolutionary Coalition (SNRC)].
Wang Yi has had reiterated the Five Principles and stated that the Geneva peace talks are a continuous process and that a follow-up mechanism should be established to keep the talks going and produce results.
With the Arab world’s emphasis on economic growth, and the Middle Eastern people’s increasing sense of independence – signs that the region is undergoing a deeper, more profound change, China has moved from being a conflict avoider to a conflict manager. China’s “Going Global” strategy of the late 1990s has thus thrusted Beijing to the hazards of pursuing interests in resource-rich regions in Africa and the Middle East to a win-win geostrategic positioning.
Firestorms 